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Since 2007, many monetary authorities have drastically changed its 
monetary policy. They began an aggressive struggle with the biggest 
economic crisis since the Great Depression. Despite the substantial 
decline in Central banks interest rates in US and EMU and despite the 
sharp easining of monetary policy in many other countries, the cost of 
credit to both households and businesses has generally risen in almost 
every country. All this leads to the question of whether monetary policy 
becomes less effective in periods of recession or not. The goal of this 
paper is to empirically examine the hypothesis of reduced effectiveness of 
monetary policy in period of economic crisis. The paper starts with 
assertions: (i) the money supply, in the narrow sense (M1) is determined 
by the monetary base (M0) and money multiplier (m), and (ii) monetary 
authority have full control on monetary base, while th  money multiplier 
are only partially determined by monetary authority. I  is also determined 
by the actions of non-banking public and the banks, and because of that 
monetary policy effectiveness could decrease in the period of economic 
crisis. Based on a sample of six countries this paper examines the strength 
of the relationship between monetary aggregates during recessions and in 
period out of recessions, and according the obtained results appropriate 
conclusions and explanations are offered. 
Keywords: economic crisis, monetary policy effectiveness, monetary 
aggregates 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
Since 2007, many monetary authorities have drastically hanged their 
monetary policy. They began an aggressive struggle with the biggest economic 
crisis since the Great Depression. Easy availability of credit in the US and debt-
financed consumer spending led to a housing construction boom and Real estate 
bubble which peaked in 2006. As a part of the housing and credit booms, the 
financial innovations such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and 
collateralized debt obligations (CDO), which derived their value from mortgage 
payments and housing prices, significantly increased. When asset prices rise too 
far out of line with fundamentals, they must come down, and eventually the 
housing price bubble burst.1 As housing prices declined, major global financial 
institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in subprime MBS reported 
significant losses. Defaults and losses on other loan types also increased 
significantly as the crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts of the 
economy. Total losses are estimated in the trillions f U.S. dollars globally (IMF, 
2010).  Lehman Brothers was liquidated, Bear Stearns nd Merrill Lynch were 
sold, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became commercial banks, Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac were placed under control of the U.S. government. These 
seven institutions were highly leveraged and had 9 trillion USD in debt or 
guarantee obligations. The crisis rapidly developed an  spread into a global 
economic shock, resulting in a number of European bk failures, declines in 
various stock indexes, and large reductions in the market value of equities and 
commodities. 
U.S. Federal Reserve and other central banks around the world knows 
that behaviour which may be optimal for an individual such as saving more 
during adverse economic conditions can be harmful for economy as a whole. That 
is because one person's consumption is another person's income. Too many 
consumers attempting to save (or pay down debt) simultaneously can cause or 
deepen a recession (that is the paradox of thrift). Because of that, they have taken 
steps in order to expand money supplies to avoid the risk of a deflationary spiral, 
in which lower wages and higher unemployment lead to a self-reinforcing decline 
in global consumption.  
FED has eased monetary policy aggressively lowering the federal funds 
rate target from 5 ¼% in September 2007 to 0 ¼% in December 2008. The ECB 
also decreased the minimum bid rate on the main refiancing operations and the 
interest rates on the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility from 4.25%, 
5.25% and 3.25%, respectively in September 2008, to 1.50%, 2.50% and 0.50%, 
respectively in March 2009.  
                                                
1 Although the problem originated in the United States, the wake-up call came from 
Europe. After Fitch and Standard&Poor's announced ratings downgrades on MBS, a BNP 
Paribas (French investment house) suspended redemption of shares held in some of its 
money market funds on August 7, 2008. That shows how extensive the globalization of 
financial markets had became. 
During the last quarter of 2008, these central banks purchased US$2.5 
trillion of government debt and troubled private asset  from banks. This was the 
largest liquidity injection into the credit market, and the largest monetary policy 
action, in world history. The governments of EU and the USA also raised the 
capital of their national banking systems by $1.5 trillion, by purchasing newly 
issued preferred stock in their major banks.  
In October 2010, Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz explained how the U.S. 
Federal Reserve was implementing another monetary policy —creating 
currency— as a method to combat the liquidity trap. By creating $600 billion and 
inserting this directly into banks, the Federal Reserve intended to encourage 
banks to finance more domestic loans and refinance mortgages. However, banks 
instead were spending the money in more profitable ar as by investing 
internationally in emerging markets (Stiglitz, 2010). 
In Croatia a strong shift in monetary policy has alo occurred. The first 
decision was made in October 2008. That was Decision to abolish the Decision of 
the marginal reserve requirement in order to increase foreign currency liquidity of 
banks. Then, in November of the same year, the reserv  r quirement rate was 
reduced from 17% to 14% which released 8.4 billion Kuna liquidity. In February 
2010 this rate was further reduced to 13%, which freed up another 2.9 billion 
Kuna for financing government and HBOR programs of encouraging bank credit 
activity. In January and then again in February 2009 CNB made decisions to 
reduce the rates of minimum required amount of foreign currency claims, first 
from 28.5 to 25 percent (in January) and then from 25 to 20 percent (in February), 
which the banking system allowed free access to a total of 18.25 billion Kuna. In 
March 2011 CNB Governor made a decision to additional easing of rates of 
minimum required amount of foreign currency claims from 20 to 17%, which 
meant for bankers 6.3 billion Kuna of new free funds. All this shows that 
monetary policy has changed from contractionary to expansionary. 
Despite the substantial decline in Central banks interest rates in US and 
EMU and despite the sharp easining of monetary policy in many other countries, 
the cost of credit to both households and businesses has generally risen in almost 
every country. Banks and other financial intermediaries have also sharply 
tightened credit standards for both household and businesses. In Croatia banks' 
ınterest rates on Kuna credits indexed to foreign currency and on credits in euros 
before crises (average for 2006) was 6.32% and in 2009 it was 8.11%. All this 
leads to the question of whether monetary policy becomes less effective during 
period of recessions or not. Paul Krugman has expressed his view on this 
phenomenon in his New York Times column, stating, “We are already, however, 
well into the realm of what I call depression economics.  By that I mean a state of 
affairs like that of the 1930s in which the usual tools of monetary policy – above 
all the Federal Reserve’s ability to pump up the economy by cutting interest rates 
– have lost all traction.” (Krugman, 2008). This view originated from Keynesian 
discussions of the effectiveness of monetary policy during the Great Depression 
period (Fishback, 2010). During the great depression of the 1930's, interest rates 
dropped below 1%. At this low interest rate, one would think that many 
businesses would have taken out loans. But this did not happen: the volume of 
loans also decreased considerably. The reason was that businesses had difficulties 
staying in business, and banks were afraid to lend them money. Because of the 
shocks to credit markets from the financial crisis, the argument is that monetary 
policy is unable to lower the cost of credit. 
The goal of this paper is to empirically examine the ypothesis of 
reduced effectiveness of monetary policy in period of economic crisis. The paper 
is divided as follows. The part after the introduction contains a brief literature 
review that can be associated with the issue of the eff ctiveness of monetary 
policy and the transfer of monetary decisions into the economy. The third part 
contains a theoretical framework and starting assumptions. After that follows 
description of the data and research results in forth part of this paper, while the 
fifth section makes concluding remarks 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Slow exit from the economic crisis have raised concer s about whether 
monetary policy has lost its effectiveness during ooing financial and economic 
crisis. Although the role of monetary policy in the economy has been examined 
extensively in many empirical literature (Keynes, 1936; Tobin, 1965; Friedman, 
1968; Barro, 1976; Goodfired & King, 1997; etc.), as well as mechanism of 
monetary policy transmission into the real economy (Friedman & Swartz, 1963; 
Bernanke, 1995; Gabe, 2000; Meltzer, 2001; Mishkin, 2007, ect.) analysis of the 
efficiency of monetary policy under different circumstances was less explored. 
Among the papers dealing with this issue the following papers should be 
mentioned.  
Gambacorta et.al. (2012) assess the macroeconomic effects of 
unconventional monetary policies by estimating a panel VAR with monthly data 
from eight advanced economies over a sample spanning the period since the onset 
of the global financial crisis. They found that an exogenous increase in central 
bank balance sheets at the zero lower bound leads to a temporary rise in economic 
activity and consumer prices, while the impact on the price level is weaker and 
less persistent.  
Abassi and Linzert (2012) analyzed the effectiveness of monetary policy 
in steering euro area money market rates by looking at the predictability of 
money market rates on the basis of monetary policy expectations and the impact 
of extraordinary central bank measures on money market rates. They found that 
during the crisis money market rates up to 12 months s ill respond to revisions in 
the expected path of future rates, even though to alesser extent than before 
August 2007. They attribute part of the loss in monetary policy effectiveness to 
money market rates being driven by higher liquidity premium and increased 
uncertainty about future interest rates. 
Catte et.al. (2011.) investigates the role of macroe onomic policies in 
the global crisis. They focus on period before crisis (2002–2007) and wonder if 
the Great Recession was avoidable.  They perform  a  number  of  counterfactual  
simulations  and conclude that US monetary policy was in analysed period over-
expansionary and they think that more effective  macro-prudential  supervision 
before crisis would made the  Great Recession less  dra tic. 
Bijapura (2009) investigates the effectiveness of mnetary policy during 
a credit crunch by estimating a vector auto regression on the US economy. He 
presents evidence that interest rate cuts have a diminished impact on growth, due 
to impairment in the relationship between monetary policy and the supply of 
intermediated credit 
Arestis and Sawyer (2003) in the centre of their research put endogenous 
of money and use of interest rates as the key element of monetary policy. They 
notice clear limits on interest rates, notably that nominal interest rates cannot go 
negative, and the level of international interest rates constrain domestic interest 
rates. Their results shows that interest rates are relatively ineffective in the control 
of inflation. 
Among domestic (Croatian) authors, the work of Bokan et.al. (2010) 
should be emphasized. The authors established a dynamic stochastic equilibrium 
(DSGE) model for Croatia. They examined the results of the simultaneous action 
of the crisis (which is modelled by proxying it with increase in the foreign 
interest rate and drop in the demand for Croatian export products) and the 
Monetary policy response (which is introduced in the form of regulatory 
requirement reduction). They found that in period of crisis, the Croatian economy 
declines despite the significant monetary policy reactions. Limitations of the 
efficiency of monetary authority influences they see in chosen strategy of keeping 
exchange rate broadly stable and in highly euroized Croatian relatively small and 
open economy. 
 
3.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Monetary policy is the process by which the monetary uthority of a 
country controls the supply of money for the purpose f promoting economic 
growth and stability. If monetary authority has difficulties in controlling money 
supply then it will not be able to act appropriately to the disturbances in the 
economy. The issue of influence of monetary authoriy on money supply is the 
issue of endogeneity of money. Traditionally it was thought that the money 
supply can be treated as exogenous and its supply is complitely under the control 
of the Central Bank (as an agent of the government). This classic view assumes 
that the money supply (M1) is a product of monetary base (B) (reserve money, 
high-powered money) and money multiplier (m): M1 = B×m, where the central 
bank is able to control the monetary base, and money multiplier is stable.  
On the other hand, supporters of the post-Keynesian theory (PK) stand 
that money supply is an endogenous variable, and that means that it is primarily 
influenced by external factors determined by demand for loans. Central banks has 
limited control of the money supply and bank reserves. Post Keynesians argue 
that credit money comes into existence as a result of borrowing from the banks, 
and it is extinguished as a result of the repayment of bank debt (Kaldor and 
Trevithick, 1981). Whenever economic actors choose t  borrow from their banks, 
they also make the deposits and bank money are created in that process. 
Whenever economic actors choose to repay their bank loans, bank money are 
destroyed. In turn, the terms on which credit money is issued, i.e. the interest rate 
charged on bank loans and paid on bank deposits, play a crucial role in governing 
the rate of expansion of the money stock (Moore, 1989). 
The concept of endogenous (bank) money is a particularly important one 
for macroeconomic analysis, especially within Keynesian economics. Bank 
money provides a more realistic approach to money in comparison with the 
exogenous, controllable money approach (in the sense that most money in an 
industrialized economy is bank money). Further, theconcept of endogenous 
money fits well with the  current approach to monetary policy based on the 
setting (or targeting) of a key interest rate. In endogenous-money models, the 
causal relationship between the stock of money and prices is reversed as 
compared with the exogenous money case. Endogenous money plays an 
important role in the causal relationship between investment and savings: simply 
the availability of loans permits the expansion of investment, which leads to a 
corresponding expansion of savings and to an expansion of bank deposits, which 
may later be extinguished as and when loans are paid off. 
In order to empirically analyse the ability of monetary authority to 
control money supply and to influence on macroeconomic real variables such as 
GDP, real wages or the level of employment, we have to start with the definition 
of money and base money and how their quantities can be measured in practice. 
In practice, the classification of instruments as ‘money’ can be 
problematic. The various financial instruments differ according to their 
transactions costs, the range in which they can be used for payment and the extent 
to which they preserve their value, i.e. the extent they have the functions of 
money.  
The narrowest subset comprises the financial instruments available for 
payment in the fastest way, at the lowest transaction costs and without restrictions  
(M1 money aggregate). It includes currency in circulation (banknotes and coins - 
G) + demand deposits available for direct payment (D). Demand deposits 
includes government deposits within Central banks, households and enterprises 
deposits within commercial banks:   
M1 = G + D (1) 
In addition to the above, the broader categories of m ney  (M2 and M3 
money aggregates) also include the less liquid liabilities of monetary financial 
institutions (MFIs), i.e. financial instruments not available for direct payment 
(time deposits and certain types of securities), depending on the respective 
transaction costs, maturities and risk levels.  
The currency in circulation (money outside the banks) (G), and the 
balance on the current accounts of credit institutions kept with the central bank 
(reserves of the banking system - R), constitute the monetary base (M0). 
M0 = G + R  (2) 
 The latter means the bank accounts on which credit inst utions keep the 
liquidity required for their day-to-day operation ad which are used to meet their 
reserve requirements. They are collectively referred to as bank reserves.  
Monetary base (reserve money) in liabilities of Central Bank is 
connected with foreign exchange reserves in assets of Central Bank. The ratio of 
these components is determined by the chosen exchange rate regime, and this 
choice affects the ability of monetary authority to implement an independent 
monetary policy. 
Central banks (CB) increases or decreases monetary base by changing 
the levels of its assets primarily based upon foreign assets and claims on banks.  
Central banks uses open market operations and foreign exchange interventions. 
When monetary authorities buy securities, the consequence is higher monetary 
base, and vice versa. The role of non-banking public (households and firms) is 
that they make a decision how much currency it wishes to hold relative to 
deposits. Although open market operations and discount loans both change the 
monetary base, the CB has greater control over openmarket operations than over 
discount loans. The CB completely controls the volume of open market 
operations because it initiates purchases or sales of securities. On the other hand, 
when banks borrow from the central bank (using standing facilities), they decide 
whether to borrow funds under these conditions or not. Of course the CB sets 
interest rates for their loans and thereby encourages or discourages banks to 
borrow. 
Beside monetary base (M0), the factor that determines the money supply 
(M1) is the monetary multiplier (m): 
M1 = m × M0 (3) 
 The size of the monetary multiplier is determined by the actions of three 
parties in the economy: the Central Bank, non-banking public and the banks. We 
can wonder what happens to the money supply when th central bank buys 
securities from commercial banks. That increases th credit potential of banks and 
banks have an incentive to loan out or invest these funds. When a commercial 
bank grants the loan (based on these resources) to non-bank public, the M1 money 
supply increases (M1 = G + D). Furthermore, loans are usually used to meet the 
obligations of the borrower, and because of that, the money eventually end up 
back to banks in a form of bank deposits, which again increases the credit 
potential of banks. This means that through a process of deposit and credit 
multiplication (based on the rate of required reserves and the rate of unused credit 
potential – excess reserves) the primary initial impulse is multiplied. 
Looking at the process of deposit and credit multiplication it seems that 
commercial banks actually create the majority of money. However, the bank can 
lend an amount equal to its excess reserves. The new deposit is created when the 
borrower spends the money that was borrowed from the bank, and when that 
money comes back into the banking system. 
Here we can notice that the central bank can expand the volume of 
deposits in the banking system by increasing reserv, and can also contract the 
volume of deposits by reducing the reserves. Central Bank reduces reserves by 
selling securities in an open market sale. This action has an effect that is similar 
to deposit expansion in the banking system, but in the opposite direction. 
Banks influence the multiplicative effects if they hold more reserves 
than prescribed by the central bank (if they have excess reserves). Non-banking 
public affects the multiplication if it holds more cash and have a lower demand 
for loans. 
Money multiplier links the monetary base to the money supply. If it is 
not stable, monetary authority will not be able to influence the money supply by 
changing monetary base. 
Equation (4) derived from equation (3) tells us that t e money multiplier 
is equal to the ratio of money supply and monetary b se: 





1=  (4) 
Recall that the money supply (M1) is the sum of currency in circulation 
(G) and deposits (D), while the monetary base (M0) is the sum of currency in 
circulation (G) and bank reserves (R). Reserves can be separated into two 
components: required reserves (RR) and excess reserves (ER). Introducing this 






+=  (5) 
As we obtained earlier, the incentive of non-banking public to hold 
currency, as well as the tendency of banks to hold excess reserves is important for 
multiplication. In order to capture these behaviours in the expression for the 
money multiplier we introduce two indicators: currency-to-deposit ratio (G/D), 
which measures the nonbank public’s holdings of currency relative to its holdings 
of deposits, and the excess reserves-to-deposit ratio (ER/D), which measure 
banks’ holdings of excess reserves relative to their d posits. To include these 
ratios in the expression for the money multiplier (5), we can divide numerator and 























m  (6) 
Equation (6) contains three components. RR/D is a part of the multiplier 
that monetary authorities have control on through the reserve requirement 
mechanism, but the other two components (G/D and ER/D) are not under its 
direct control. An increase in the G/D causes the value of the money multiplier to 
decline and, if the monetary base is unchanged, the value of the money supply 
will decline. That is because, if households and firms hold more currency relative 
to the deposits, banks will have less money to lend which will reduce the 
multiplication of deposits. An increase in required reserve ratio (RR/D) also 
causes the value of the multiplier to decline because banks will have less money 
to lend because it will have to use it in order to maintain higher required reserves. 
An increase in the excess reserves-to-deposit ratio (ER/D) causes the value of the 
money multiplier to decline, because, if banks hold relatively more excess 
reserves, that means that they are not using these funds to make loans as part of 
the process of multiple deposit creation. Banks make the decision about ER/D 
ratio. 
























=  (7) 
This equation shows the way the money supply, measur d with the M1 
aggregate, is a function of the various variables and some of them are not under 
direct influence of monetary policy. If we assume that monetary multiplier is 
relatively stable, than central bank’s influence on monetary base is crucial in 
regulating money supply, and since the inflation process is related to the amount 
of money, it is practical for the central bank to influence the size of the monetary 
aggregates (quantity theory of money). 
 
4.  DATA AND RESULTS 
If there is a significantly lower correlation between M0 and M1 during 
the recession this could indicate that monetary authority loses it effectiveness 
during the recessions. In order to determine that, t e correlation coefficients for 
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Input data consists of monthly values of M1 and M0 for selected five 
countries (Argentina, Croatia, Lithuania, Switzerland, Ukraine and the U.S.) and 
European Monetary Union (EMU). Criteria for selecting the country in the 
analysis are the data availability and the occurrence of the economic crisis. The 
data  were obtained from IMF database (http://elibrary-
data.imf.org/DataExplorer.aspx). Statistical analysis was conducted using the 

















































Figure 1 Movement of M0 and M1 monetary aggregates  
Source: author’s calculations based on data from IMF database 
Note: Shaded intervals denote recession periods 
 
In figure 1 we can see that the variables M0 and M1 for different 
countries have different movement pattern. For most c untries and for most of the 
analysed time they have tendency to grow in tandem. For Argentina, it can be 
noticed that both variables (M0 and M1) start its exponential growth at the end of 
recession (in early 2003). In Croatia we have a stable (but not exponential) 
growth of these variables from 2000 until the beginning of the crisis in late 2008. 
From 2008 till the end of analysed period we have stagnation of M1 and slower 
growth of M0.  
In Lithuania the growth is significant from 2001 all the way down 2007 
when a recession started as well as a significant decline in both variables. After 
the recession both variables started to grow again. Switzerland had an almost 
constant M0 variable until the beginning of the recession at the end of 2008 and 
slow growth of M1 variable. The graph on Figure 1 reveals that the move ent of 
M1 cannot be explained by the movement of M0 variable. Switzerland 
significantly increased the amount of base money in 2011 when we have a crisis 
in Eurozone and increased exchange rate of the Swiss franc vis – a – vis euro. 
Because of the Eurozone crisis, too many people were buying the franc to put 
their money in Switzerland, which is safer than Europe. But this was raising the 
value of the franc, making exporting Swiss goods more expensive, and hence 
hurting Switzerland’s economy. Because of that at the end of 2011 the Swiss 
National Bank decided to peg the franc to the euro at 1.20 francs for euro. 
The most significant changes in the movement and relation between M0 
and M1 can be seen for U.S. economy. Namely, Figure 1 show  a strong growth 
in M0 at the beginning of the recession, and not so strong esponse of M1 growth. 
Because of that, the monetary multiplier for US has dropped below 1 (this 
phenomenon can also be seen in Croatia), which indicates that in the period of 
recession the association of these variables (M0 and M1) is reduced. In addition, 
aftermath the recession the reduction of M0 does not slow down the growth of 
M1, which means that in the post crisis period there is also reduced the linkage 
between these variables in US as well. 
Finally, as far as the concerned of movement of these variables for the 
EMU, we can also notice (which is confirmed in further calculations) the 
diminished correlation between M0 and M1 variables during the recession, but 
also aftermath the recession. 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for M0 and M1 variables  
 ARG_M0 CRO_M0 EMU_M0 LIT_M0 SWI_M0 USA_M0 
 Mean  59265.60  29579.32  788087.7  7466.916  57950.24  945186.4 
 Median  34149.19  27037.79  698391.5  6680.600  40187.00  701457.0 
 Maximum  265189.0  63883.65  1774568.  17279.80  347430.0  2692502. 
 Minimum  10783.92  3107.136  415566.0  2193.500  29480.00  390869.0 
 Std. Dev.  59942.12  20108.54  349192.2  3696.331  54667.75  672796.7 
 Skewness  1.462409  0.241606  1.048987  0.292727  3.271315  1.531049 
 Kurtosis  4.520026  1.471359  3.518451  1.718599  13.94157  3.927191 
 Jarque-Bera  101.8598  23.88177  31.91362  15.79527  1523.661  95.96366 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000007  0.000000  0.000372  0.000000  0.000000 
 Sum  13334760  6596189.  1.29E+08  1426181.  13038803  2.13E+08 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev.  8.05E+11  8.98E+10  1.99E+13  2.60E+09  6.69E+11  1.01E+14 
 Observations  225  223  164  191  225  225 
 ARG_M1 CRO_M1 EMU_M1 LIT_M1 SWI_M1 USA_M1 
 Mean  91103.63  42738.62  2806306.  15238.33  263779.8  1351593. 
 Median  65745.75  46370.72  2561474.  13724.10  259683.0  1266000. 
 Maximum  313747.7  57878.27  5022864.  32836.00  521900.0  2349800. 
 Minimum  15087.55  22164.86  1228742.  3339.200  130951.0  1054700. 
 Std. Dev.  77046.24  9241.611  1214898.  9466.769  98598.24  312919.6 
 Skewness  1.139749 -0.413971  0.329081  0.212755  0.855712  1.506149 
 Kurtosis  3.492613  1.853599  1.712427  1.472791  2.890491  4.618127 
 Jarque-Bera  40.11098  10.83183  19.60332  20.00268  27.57154  109.6151 
 Probability  0.000000  0.004445  0.000055  0.000045  0.000001  0.000000 
 Sum  16125343  5556020.  6.31E+08  2910521.  59350445  3.04E+08 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev.  1.04E+12  1.10E+10  3.31E+14  1.70E+10  2.18E+12  2.19E+13 
 Observations  177  130  225  191  225  225 
Source: author’s calculations based on data from IMF database 
 
Descriptive statistical analysis (see Table 1) shows that all distributions 
except CRO_M1 have a long right tail. In addition, the distributions CRO_M0, 
LIT_M0, CRO_M1, EMU_M1, LIT_M1 and SWI_M1 of view are peaked 
(leptokurtic) relative to the normal, while the distributions ARG_M0, EMU_M0, 
SWI_M0, USA_M0, ARG_M1 and USA_M1 are flat (platykurtic) compared to 
the normal distribution. 
Jarque-Bera is a test statistic for testing whether  series is normally 
distributed. The test statistic measures the difference of the skewness and kurtosis 
of the series from those of normal distribution. The reported probability is a 
probability that a critical value of the Jarque-Bera is greater (in absolute terms) 
than the obtained value. A small probability value eads to the rejection of the 
null hypothesis of a normal distribution for all distr butions.  
Results of the correlation analysis between underlying variables are 
shown in Table 2 
Table 2 
Correlation coefficients between M0 and M1 in recession periods and in periods of 
growth 
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9 0.479378    
Source: author’s calculations based on data from IMF database 
 
 
Table 2 and Figure 1 show that, among the analyzed countries including 
EMU, Croatia had the highest number of recession (fur) and together with 
Argentina, Croatia had one of the highest number of quarters in recession (66 
months Croatia, and 72 months Argentina). Other countries recorded two or only 
one period in a recession with an average number of 21.75 months in recession. 
In some countries strong correlation between M0 and M1 variables can be noticed, 
and for other countries this relationship is weaker (EMU, Switzerland). 
Nonetheless, for almost all analysed countries (except for Switzerland) the 
connection between M0 and M1 was lower during a recession compared with 
period out of recession, or compared with period aftermath the recession. To 
statistically confirm that, we can implement the t-t st. In our sample we have ten 
correlation coefficients for recession periods and 13 correlation coefficients for 
periods without recession. In order to test hypothesis of equality of means we can 
use expression (8).  
 
                (8) 
 
The data for calculation are summarised in table 3. 
 
Table 3.  
Data for calculation t-test 
 Mean of R n σ 
Periods in recession  0.716842 10 0.145731 
Periods out of recession 0.858046 13 0.208299 
 
H0 and H1 hypothesis are: 
 
 




ttab = 2.080 – probability of t-distribution, with df = 21 and α=0.05  
 
 
Obtained results of t-test confirms the significantly different correlation 
coefficients between analysed series, and that proves our initial thesis of the 
reduced ability of monetary authorities to influenc the money supply by 
changing monetary base in period of recession. Thatfact could be the obstacle for 
channelling monetary measures toward real sector and should be taken into the 
consideration in process of decision making. 
 
3.  CONCLUSION  
This research shows that in period of crisis monetary authority hampered 
controlling the movement of the money supply. The reasons for that we can find 
in changed behaviour of banks and non-banking sector (h useholds and 
businesses). Namely, in periods of crisis and uncertainty banks are reluctant to 
grant the loans to households and to businesses as well because of increased 
credit risk and because the deterioration in their balance sheets. Additionaly, 
because of rising unemployment and fear of job loss, households demand for 
loans stagnated, and in a same time they start to withdraw money from the bank 



























21 Hreject  we⇒>
.* tt
deposit (G/D) and excess reserves-to-deposit (ER/D) ratios and consenquently the 
decline of money multiplier and money supply. 
The obtained results of the reduced effectiveness of monetary policy in 
periods of economic crisis that arising from reduced money multiplier does not 
mean that there is no reason to use monetary tools t  cope with the crisis. On the 
contrary, the results suggests that when making the decisions about certain 
monetary measures it should be taken into the consideration the reduced effect of 
the policy actions that was experienced in periods f crises. So, if the goal of the 
monetary authority is to offset the contractionary effects of a financial crisis, then 
it should pursue more aggressive monetary policy than usual, but it should also 
prepare the exit strategy in a case of high inflation. 
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